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"Of dl the uJ d I e +a2
the
world posses st^, t h most vats
abEc md most d8cisive is people."

The Soviets and the Individual
By JOSEPH STALIN

OMRADES, it m

denied that we have
reaendy achieved important successes both in
the sphere of construction and in the sphere of administration, In this connection there is too much
talk abut the merits of chiefs, about the merits of
leaders. All or newly aU our achievemen& art
mibed to them. ~ h z ofi mum, is wrong, it is incorrect. It is not m m l y a matter of l&.
But
it is not of this I wanted to speak today, I should
like to say a few words about dm,abut our
d m in g e n d and h u t the d r e a of our Red
Army in pad&.
You know that we inherited from the olden days a
tachniartfy b a c k d , impoverished and ruined cormtry. Ruined by four years of imperialist war, wnd
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ruined again by three years of civil war, a country
with a semi-literate popuIation, with a low f e d m i d
level, with isolated industrial oases lost in a d t e r
of minute peasant f a r d was the country we
inherited from the past. The problem was to transfer
this mutry from the h a of m e d i d d a r k to
the lines of mdem industry and mechanized agridture. The problem, as you see, was a serious and
d i W t one. The question that confronted us was
that & h e we solve this problem in the shortest
possible time and consolidate Socialism in our country, or we do not solve it, in which case our countrytedmically weak and d d y unenlightenedwould lose its independence and become a stake in
the game of the imperhht powera
At that time our country was pa&ng through a
period of acute famine in technical resources, There
were not: enough machines for industry. There were
no machines for sgridhre. There were no-ins
for transport. There was not that bematttry techn i d base without which the industrial transformation of a country is ~ n c e i m b 1 e .AII that existed
were isolated preliminary raquisitcs for the creation
of such a b.A 6rstjaSS industry had to k
created. This industry had to be so directed as to be
4
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capable of technimlly reorganizl~gnut only industry,

but also our agriculture and
And for this it was -n

our railway transport.
to make sacrifices and
to impme rigorous economy in everything-; it was
neewry to economize on food, on schools and on
cedes, in order to accumulate the funds required
for the aeation of industry. There was no other

way of overaoming the famine in technical resow=.
Thus Lenin taught us, and in this matter we fol-

lowed in the fmtsteps of Lain.
Naturally, in so great and di6cult a matter unvarying and rapid success muld not be expected. In
a matter like this success comes only after several
y m . We had therefore to arm ourselves with
strong nerves, Bolshevik grit and stubborn patience
in order to counteract the first failures and to march
unswervingly towards the great goal, without permitting any wavering or uncertainty in our ranks.
You know that we set about this task in precisely
this way. But not all our comrades had the necessary
spirit, patience and grit. Among our mrnrades there
proved to be people who at the h s t difficulties began
to mlZ for a retreat. Let bygones tK bygon~,it is
said. That, of course, is true. But man is endowed
with memory, and when summing up the results of
5
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our work one invoIuntarily r e d s the past. ( h g h tsr.) Well then, there were c o d among us
who mre scared by the &&ties and b e p to d
l
on the Party to retreat. They said: "What is the
g o d of your industdization and aoUectivization,
your machines, iron and st& indwtry, tractors, mmbines, automobiles? It would be ktter if you gave
w more textiles, if you bought more raw materhh
for the prduction of mmumemJgoods and gave the
population more of the dthing3 which adorn the
life of man. The mtion of hdustry, and a firstd m industry at that, when we are so hackward, is
a dangerous d m . ' '
Of course, we could have used the three billion
rubies of foreign c u r m q obtained as a result of the
severest economy, and v i l t on the meation of our
industry, for the importation of raw materials and
for increasing the production of articles of general
consumption. That is also a kind of 'cplan". But
with such a "plan" we should not have had a metallurgical industry, w a machine-buildingindustry, or
tractors and automobiles, or airplanes and lanks. We
should have found o d v e s unarmed in the face of
the external foe. W e should have undermined the
foundations of Socialism in o w country. We should
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e found ourselves in captivity to the burgeoisie,
home and foreign.
It is evident that a choim had to be made ktween
two plans: between the plan of retreat, leading, and
bound to lead, to the defeat of Sodalism, and the
plan of advance, which led and, as you h o w , has
h d y led to the victory of Socialism in our country.
We chose the plan of advance and moved forward
along the Leninist road, brushing those 0
0
aside, as being people who saw something only when
it was under their ILOSS, but who closed their eyes
to the immediate future of our country, to the future
of Socialism in our country.
But these c o d did not always confine themselves to criticism and +ve
resistanm. They threatened to raise a m o l t in the Parq against the Centrid
Committee. More, they threatened some of us with
bullets. Evidently, they reckoned on frightening us
and c o m p d b g w to leave the Leninist road. These
people, apparently, forgot that we Bolsheviks are
people of a s p e d cut. They forgot that you annot
frighten Bolshwh by difhltics or by threats. They
forgot that we were forged by the great Lain, our
leader, our t&m, our father, who did not know
fear in the fight and did not recognize it. They for-

h

~
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the more the enemies rage and the more
hysterical the foes within the Party h m e , the more
red-hot the BoIsheviks become for fresh struggles
and the more vigorously they push forward
Of course, it never even occurred to w to leave
the Leninist road. More, having established ourselves on this road, we pushed forward still more
vigorously, brushing every obstacle from our path.
It is true that in our course we were obliged to
handle some of these comrades roughly. But you
m o t help that. I must confess that I too took a
hand in this business. (Lo& cheers.)
Yes, comrades, we proceeded confidently and vigornusly along the road of industrializing and collectivizing our country. And now we may consider that
the road has been traversed.
Everybody now admits that we have achieved
tremendous successes dong this road. Everybody
now admits that we already have a powerful, firstclass industry, a powerful mehanized agriculture, a
growing and improving transport system, an organgot that

ized and excellentIy equipped Red Army.
This means that we have in the main outlived the
period of famine in techniml resources.
But, having outlived the period of famine in tech8
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nicd resources, we have entered a new period, a
period, I would say, of famine in the matter o f
people, in the matter of adre, in the matter o f
workers mpable of harnessing technique and advancing it. The point is that we have factories, d
s
,
collective farms, Soviet farrns, aa army; we have
technique for all this; but we lack people with sufficient experience to squeeze out of technique all that
can be squeezed out of it. Formerly, we used to say
that "technique decides everything'. This slogan
helped us in this respect, that we put an end to the
famine in technical resources and rreated an extensive
techniml base in every branch of activity far the
equipment of our people with first-class technique.
That is very good. But it is very, very far from
enough. In order to set technique going and to utilize it to the full, we need people who have mastered
technique, we need mdres capable of mastering and
utilizing this technique according to all the rules of
the art. Without people who have mastered technique, technique is dead. Technique in the charge o f
people who have mastered technique a n and should
perform miracles. If in our first-class mills and
factories, in our Soviet farms and collective farms
and in our Red Army we had su6icient d e s mpable
of harnessing the technique, our country would se9
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cure results three times and four times greater than at

present. That is why emphasis must now be laid on
people, on d e s , on workers who have mastered
technique. That is why the old slogan, "Technique
decides everythqf', which is a reflection of a period
we have M
yp
d through, a period in which
we s u E e d from a famine in technical. res0urce.q
must now be replaced by a new slogan, the slogan
"Cndres decide everything'? That is the main thing
now.
Ckn it k said that our people have fully understood and realized the p t significance of this new
slogan? I would not say that. Otherwise, there
would not have been the outrageous attitude towards
people, ' c o p & cadres, towards workers, which we
not infrequently o b e in practie. The slogan
"Cadres decide everything: demands that our 1 4 ers should display the most d c i t o u s attitude t o d '
our workers, "little" and tCbigl', no matter in what
sphere they are engaged, cultivating them assiduously, assisting them when they need support, encouraging them when they display their first successes, advancing them, and so forth. Yet, in practice
we meet in a number of mses with a soulless, bureaucratic md positively outrageous attitude towards
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workers. This, indeed, explains why instead of being
studied, and p l d at their pasts only after being
studied, people are frequently flung about like
pawns. People have learnt how to value machinery
and to make reports of how many u m h k we have
in our d s and factories. But I do not h o w of
one instance when a report was made with equal zest
of the number of people we have developed in a
given period, how we & people to grow and
become tempered in their work How is this to be
explained? It is to bt explained by the fact that we
have not yet learnt to value people, to value workers,

valk dm.
I r e d an incident in Siberia, Where X was at one
time in exile. It was in the spring, at the time of the.
spring floods. About thirty men went to h e river to'
pull out timber which had been m i e d away by the
vast, swollen river. T o w & evening they returned
to the village, but with one comrade mising, When
asked where the thiieth man was, they unconcernedly replied that the thirtieth man had "remained
there". T o my quesion, "How do you mean, remained there?" they replied with the same uconcern, "Why askArowned, of course." And thereupon one of them began to hurry away, sying, "1
to
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have got to go and water the mare." When I reproached them for having more concern fer animals
than for men, one of them, amid the general approval of the re-st, said, "Why should we be concerned about men? We mn alwzys make men. But
a mare , , just try and make a mare.', (Lmghtp..)
Here you haw a ase, not very signifrant perhaps,
but very characteristic I t seems to me that the indifference shown by certain of our leaders to people,
to a h , and their inability to d u e people, is a
survival of that strange attitude of man to man displayed in the episode in far-off Sikria just d a t e d .
And so, comrades, if we want successfully to overcome the famine it1 the matter of people and to provide our country with sufficient mdres, mpable of
advancing technique and setting it going, we must

.

first of all learn to value people, to value &a, to
value every worker capable of benefiting our common
muse.
It is time to realize that of all the valuable
capital the world possesses, the most valuable and

most decisive is people, cadres. It must be realized
that under our present conditions "mdres decide
everything". If we have good and numerous cadres
in industry, agriculture, transport and the army-
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our country will be invincible. If we do not have
such d m - w e shall be lame on both fee^
In mnduding my s p e d , permit me to offer a
toast to the health and success of our graduates from
the Red Axmy M e m y . I wish them
in the
cause of organizing and leading the defense of our
country.
Commdq you have graduated from the a d a n y ,
a school in which you received your first sttei'ing.
But school is only a preparatory stage. Cadres receive
their r d stding in actual work, outs& school, in
fighting ditficulties, in overcoming dificuldes. Remember, comrades, that only those d m are any
good who do not fear di6culties, who do not hide
from difficulties, but who, on the contrary, go out
to meet difficulties, in order to overcome them and
eliminate them. It is only in combating &&dtks
that real mdres are forged. And if our army posesm
genuinely steeled cadres in suficient numbers, it w U

be invincible.
Your health, comrades! (Storavy apphse. All
&. L d chems for Sulk.)
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